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H

opkins’s subject, as expressed in the title of his book, is an important one that deserves more attention among Latter-day
Saint thinkers. First, he presents a “big-picture” view of what Latterday Saints regard as an apostasy among the early Christians. He explains its origins and mechanisms and the resulting classical theist
view of God. en he proceeds to argue for the Latter-day Saint view
of God—as opposed to the traditional Christian1 view—on historical, scriptural, and philosophical grounds. While few would dispute
the idea that Greek and Hellenistic philosophy influenced traditional
Christian teaching, Latter-day Saints have a unique perspective on the
nature and extent of that influence, particularly on how it may have
been destructive.
To address these topics is an ambitious proposition and more
than one man could fully accomplish in a lifetime, let alone in one
1. By “traditional Christians,” I mean, broadly, Roman Catholics, Protestants, and
Eastern Orthodox. Of course, there are important differences of belief among them, but on
many points in this review I will treat them as a group, as all maintaining some variation
on classical theism.

Review of Richard R. Hopkins. How Greek Philosophy Corrupted the
Christian Concept of God. Bountiful, Utah: Horizon, 1998. 464 pp.,
with scripture and subject indexes. $24.98.
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book. I admire Hopkins’s willingness to approach these issues.2 However, the simple magnitude of the task does not excuse many of the
book’s shortcomings. Although the book has some very welcome
qualities, it also has the unfortunate drawbacks of being chronically
inaccurate, unpersuasive, and unfair. If the intent of his arguments
was merely to leave his opponents tongue-tied or frustrated, he might
succeed, and such a goal may be well suited to, say, a radio talk show.
But it is not appropriate for a book that ought, first and foremost, to
inform its reader about an important, controversial topic.
Hopkins aspires to present a comprehensive case for the superiority of the Latter-day Saint view of God over the traditional Christian view, and the form of his presentation fits this aspiration. In
substance, however, the book only half escapes being an unsatisfying
retort to one minor contemporary polemic. Hopkins’s work has succumbed to the typical vices of polemic itself, and thus his reasoning
is no more sound on the whole than that in the article to which it
primarily responds: Francis Beckwith’s “Philosophical Problems with
the Mormon Concept of God.”3 is review will mainly assess what
went wrong in the hope of improving the quality of discussion and
understanding between Latter-day Saints and traditional Christians.
I will conclude with some remarks on what it would take to treat this
2. Hopkins was educated in engineering and law. Besides working in law, he has appeared on a number of radio shows, including “e Bible Answerman,” and has hosted his
own weekly show, “Religion Today,” broadcast in Utah on the Wasatch Front. At the time
of publication of How Greek Philosophy Corrupted the Christian Concept of God, Hopkins
was manager of sales and marketing for the publisher (dust jacket).
Perhaps his experience in law influences the argumentative style of the book. In a
United States courtroom, it is not the job of the prosecuting attorney, for example, to mention evidence that strengthens the case for the defense. A scholar, however, must strive for
objectivity, presenting in the most defensible way even views he criticizes.
3. Hopkins indicates that the book began largely as a response to Francis Beckwith’s
article, which appeared in Christian Research Journal 14/4 (1992): 24–29. Strangely,
Hopkins cites the article as it appears on the Internet, while neglecting Beckwith’s more
comprehensive book on the same topic, e Mormon Concept of God, coauthored with
Stephen Parrish (Lewiston: Mellen, 1991). Beckwith’s article describes itself as presenting a
mere sample of the more thorough work in this and another book.
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subject properly. Making the attempt at all is laudable, but we can and
must do better.4
Perhaps the most unsettling feature of the book is its oscillation
between generosity and antagonism. e title is misleading in one
sense: the book generously casts Greek philosophy as an almost innocent bystander in the corruption of the Christian concept of God,
attributing the main cause to a lack of proper leadership. Hopkins
shows us that Greek philosophy contains valuable truths and that the
philosophers’ work helped prepare the way for Christ’s teachings to
be more readily received, especially among the Gentiles. Hopkins is
also generous in his account of early Christian figures: they unwittingly ushered in false views of God while striving to uphold their
faith under difficult conditions, ironically introducing error through
their attempts at apologetics.
Unfortunately, the polemical ring of the title is rather representative of the second half of the book. e tension between these two
moods comes through strikingly when Hopkins warns Latter-day
Saint readers who converse with traditional Christians about the
nature of God: “like the Pharisees of Christ’s time, many orthodox
Christians feel they are listening to blasphemy when anyone disagrees with their concept of God. at reaction must be treated with
kindness and consideration” (p. 29). Hopkins is right that we must
be kind and considerate. Yet comparing our traditional Christian
contemporaries to the Pharisees, whom they, as well as we, remember as archetypes of hypocrisy, is hardly an example of kindness and
consideration. Instead, it insults traditional Christians while encouraging Latter-day Saints to be judgmental and dismissive. is same
4. By we I mean the Latter-day Saint community, especially thinkers and writers. I
am a committed Latter-day Saint and accept part of the responsibility to do better. In this
review I will argue that much of Hopkins’s attack on traditional Christian views is unfair.
Of course, I agree with Hopkins that the LDS view is more correct, reflecting a greater
portion of revealed truth. Still, it is imperative that we be fair and charitable in considering traditional Christian views. We must acknowledge what truth we find there, and we
must not represent traditional Christians as unreasonable or insincere where their errors
arise primarily from a lack of prophetic leadership.
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dismissive mood pervades the second half of the book in reasoning
too superficial to be persuasive and in rhetoric more insulting than
the example above. us while Hopkins’s presentation on Greek and
early Christian belief may cultivate charity in the Latter-day Saint
reader, his treatment of traditional Christian belief as it stands today
does not. is does not seem in harmony with the gospel that teaches
us to love both neighbor and enemy. Surely we must first love our
brothers whom we have seen and then worry about whether we love
those who have been dead for centuries.

Overview
e most helpful parts of the book are parts 1 and 2, which
trace the historical origins of the false teachings that took hold following the deaths of the original apostles. Part 1 surveys Greek and
Hellenistic philosophy, highlighting ideas that later caused trouble
for Christianity and sketching the spread of Greek ideas and educational practices. Part 2 identifies major intellectual figures in the
early Christian community and traces their responses to pressures on
the community. It explores the origin of doctrines Latter-day Saints
believe to be mistaken and suggests causes for the adoption of these
doctrines. Here Hopkins offers a generally sensible perspective that
may be helpful to Latter-day Saint readers who wonder what to make
of Greek philosophy and its influence on the early Christians. e
kernel of his account of how mistaken ideas took hold is persuasive
and illuminating, though, regrettably, he misconstrues some of the
key ideas themselves.
Part 3 considers traditional Christian beliefs about God as they
stand today such as God’s status as creator; his omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, and immutability; and the nature of the three
persons of the Godhead. Hopkins critiques these beliefs in terms of
their historical roots, their foundation in and consistency with scripture, and their philosophical defensibility. In part 4 Hopkins pauses to
rebut recent philosophical attacks on the Latter-day Saint doctrine of
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God before the final, summary chapter. ese latter parts suffer most
from the disappointingly cavalier approach Hopkins takes to both his
opponents and his reasoning.
Having been trained in philosophy, I will comment briefly on
Hopkins’s sections on history and theology and will deal at greater
length with his reasoning in the philosophical and scriptural defense
of the Latter-day Saint doctrine of God. I will also take up several
points on which his rhetoric is highly offensive. e book addresses
a huge range and number of issues. I will comment on a few of the
most important, as well as on others that provide examples of recurring problems with Hopkins’s approach. I will close with some reflections on what might be required to effectively carry out the worthy
project Hopkins attempts.

Part 1
Hopkins’s brief history in part 1 gives the reader a tantalizing
glimpse into Greek and Hellenistic philosophy. e main function of
this part is to highlight currents of Greek thought that figure prominently in the formation of traditional Christian orthodoxy: Hopkins
emphasizes Parmenidean metaphysics; Aristotle’s notion of substance, or ousia; the notion of a priori knowledge; and the Hellenistic
tradition of allegorical interpretation. ese currents are important
for understanding the historical origins of classical theology. Further,
in learning about them, the reader also becomes familiar with concepts
necessary for understanding the contemporary theological debate
Hopkins pursues in parts 3 and 4. His choice of topics is sensible, but
his treatment of each of them has serious problems, as I will demonstrate. ere is one conspicuous lapse of coverage, as well: Hopkins
does not offer a focused discussion of the disdainful view of matter
as corrupt that appears in the writings of Plato and others, although
this view certainly contributed to the traditional belief that God is
incorporeal.
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e most helpful feature of this section is Hopkins’s effort to
temper the typical Latter-day Saint wariness of philosophy.5 His message is welcome because many Latter-day Saints are accustomed to
thinking of philosophy as inherently in conflict with faith. True, the
philosophies of men have sometimes led people away from revealed
truth; yet, Hopkins points out, in its own way Greek philosophy
prepared the Gentiles to receive the gospel, much like the law of
Moses prepared the Hebrews. Hopkins refers to several philosophical teachings that resemble biblical truths or truths of the restoration.
For instance, Aristotle and the Stoics spoke of one God rather than
many—one who is perfectly good and just rather than whimsical and
selfish, as Zeus and his ilk appear to be in some stories. Plato tells of
a time before our births when our souls learned eternal truths firsthand, and he teaches that these truths are the key to happiness, both
in this life and aerward. e Stoics taught that all human beings are
brothers and sisters.
ough he is right to recognize truths in the classical texts, Hopkins seems a bit too ready to see his own ideas reflected in them. For
example, according to Plato’s view of our premortal existence, our
souls supposedly learned everything there, and our embodied state
is something we should be glad to escape; however, according to
Latter-day Saint belief, we are blessed with mortality and a body so
that we may learn things we could not have learned in the premortal
state (see pp. 43–44; cf. Meno 81d; Crito 66b–67b; 2 Nephi 2:22–26;
Abraham 3:24–26). Similarly, Hopkins seems simply to read his own
LDS interpretation of the soul into Aristotle’s discussion of active and
passive intellect in De Anima; in actuality, what Hopkins says about
active intellect has little connection to what Aristotle says. In short,
the exposure to these ideas and texts is not as helpful as it could be
because Hopkins’s eagerness to cast them in a positive light leads him
to mischaracterize them at times.
5. ough I will not pretend to be unbiased on this point, I consider it important primarily as an exercise of charity toward those with whom one disagrees. Such an exercise is more
important as it appears in part 2, regarding the early Christians, since it relates more directly to
our relationships with contemporary Christians who may passionately disagree with us.
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Hopkins’s summary of Parmenides’ ideas is accurate enough for
a book of this sort. e problem is that Hopkins writes as though
metaphysical thought remained essentially Parmenidean thereaer.
It is fair to say that Parmenides was the father of what we now call
metaphysics, but Plato and Aristotle each dramatically transformed
the field in their efforts to resolve Parmenides’ paradoxes. Parmenides
affirmed that the cosmos is in perfect unity and that the motion,
change, and difference we experience are all illusory. Yet motion,
change, and difference are all real, and disarming Parmenides’ arguments
to the contrary was a project for both Plato and Aristotle,6 though
how successful they were at explaining change and difference without
creating more paradox is a question for further discussion. Paradoxes
reminiscent of those in Parmenides appear later, in Neoplatonic
thought, which certainly influenced early Christian thought. Hence
one might find some of Hopkins’s remarks apt in reference to Neoplatonic metaphysics, but the facts do not support his treatment of
Greek metaphysics as though it were all one.
Unfortunately, throughout his book Hopkins uses the term metaphysics mainly to mean the unabashed assertion of nonsense, justified by the doctrine that since the world of everyday experience is illusory, truth need not make sense in everyday terms—in other words,
it need not make sense at all (see p. 115). At one point Hopkins characterizes the founding idea of metaphysics as “the Greek idea that
reality is not real” (p. 211). is notion spares him the trouble of trying
to make sense of many odd-sounding ideas that appear later in history,
but it results in the seriously mistaken premise that their advocates
had no intention of making sense. Notable among the ideas Hopkins
dismisses in this way is the doctrine of the Trinity, which he describes
as “openly irrational” (p. 189). is is hardly a statement calculated to
win friends among Trinitarians.
Surprisingly, the brightest spot in Hopkins’s history of philosophy
is his discussion of Aristotle’s conception of substance, or ousia—a
6. See, for example, Daniel W. Graham, Aristotle’s Two Systems (Oxford: Clarendon,
1987), 124–27.
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post-Parmenidean metaphysical notion that is influential in the
Trinitarian view of the Godhead established at Nicea. He accurately
distinguishes the three senses of substance that Aristotle recognizes:
matter; form; and the concrete, individual thing that incorporates
both matter and form. He even specifies correctly that the Nicene
formula, stating that the Father and Son are of the same substance,
uses the notion of substance in the sense of form.7 Unfortunately, he
never puts this account of substance to use to explain the doctrine
of the Trinity, even though this doctrine figures prominently in later
sections of the book. While he repeatedly reminds us that much confusion has arisen over the years from misunderstanding the various
senses of substance (see, e.g., pp. 190–91, 216), by the time Hopkins
turns his attention to the doctrine of the Trinity, he seems to have forgotten that there were any different senses to distinguish and settles
on a sense other than the one he refers to at first: he uses substance
as though it refers to an individual thing (see, e.g., pp. 141, 189). An
accurate portrayal of Trinitarian doctrine is crucial in a book on the
Christian concept of God; I will revisit this issue below.
Another key influence on traditional Christian orthodoxy was “the
adoption of a priori assumptions common among the Hellenized nations” (p. 208). I will discuss this idea now because it arguably belongs
with the other Greek and Hellenistic influences discussed in part 1,
though Hopkins addresses it at the beginning of part 3. Presumably the
idea of a priori knowledge itself was not the immediate source of error. Rather, the sources of error were various particular ideas the early
Christians took to be a priori truths. Hopkins cites the idea that God
must be incorporeal as a main example (see pp. 206–7). Still, he focuses
his attack on the very idea of a priori knowledge: “In order for a man’s
thoughts [e.g., Greek philosophy] to generate truth about God, it must
be presumed that a priori knowledge of Him is innate in Men, inde7. I do not mean to imply that the Nicene formula employs a strictly Aristotelian
concept of substance. Rather, of the Aristotelian concepts of substance, the one that is
compatible with the intent of the Nicene formula is substance as form or essence. See note
14 below.
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pendent of any particular experience. . . . However, there is no scriptural authority for that notion” (p. 208).
is brusque claim is not a good beginning to Hopkins’s assessment. For one thing, earlier he found in Plato reason to believe one
can “conceive or imagine the truth through the exercise of reason and
imagination,” aside from revelation (p. 44)—that is, he found reason
to believe in something like a priori knowledge. Moreover, scriptural
authority strongly supports belief in something like a priori knowledge, both in the Bible and in modern revelation—namely, knowledge
received by the light of Christ. John 1 refers to Christ as “the Word”
(v. 1) and then as “the true Light, which lighteth every man that cometh
into the world” (v. 9). Hopkins cites Romans 2:14–15 as an indication
that this light, or conscience, gives only a sense of right and wrong; but
while that scripture does identify that role, it does not cast doubt on
the other role of the light of Christ—that of delivering eternal truths.
Moreover, Doctrine and Covenants 93 expands John’s teaching in
John 1, repeatedly referring to Christ as the spirit of truth (e.g., in vv. 9,
11, 23, and 26) and specifying that “truth is knowledge of things as they
are, and as they were, and as they are to come” (v. 24). Knowledge we
receive through the light of Christ gives us insight into eternal truths
that transcend our mortal experience, much like a priori knowledge.
Consider also how Paul seems to refer to some innate knowledge in
saying, “e Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the
children of God” (Romans 8:16). us Hopkins ignores many passages
of scripture, and misrepresents others, by claiming that scripture gives
no support to the idea of a priori knowledge.
Hopkins goes on to give several examples of a priori beliefs that
have proven false, as if to undermine all a priori beliefs by association.
It is not difficult to give such examples; however, one could also give
many examples of obsolete scientific beliefs that were, in their day,
supposedly based on empirical evidence, such as the belief that light
is a wave in the ether. Yet the empirical scientific method is a good
source of knowledge. Similarly, the fact that it has led to some false
beliefs is hardly enough to discredit all a priori knowledge. Further,
belief in a priori knowledge is alive today among philosophers who
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have great respect for the achievements of empirical science. us,
while pointing out the risks of making a priori claims is worthwhile,
this is no substitute for assessing the individual merits of particular
claims. I will later treat Hopkins’s attempt in part 3 to argue specifically that corporeality is more fitting for God than incorporeality.
Hopkins points to a Greek tradition of allegorical interpretation
as another source of corruption in early Christian belief. He claims
that allegorical interpretation originated in Greek efforts to “find
themes of goodness and virtue consistent with the new monotheism
in the old pagan stories,” which depicted a plurality of gods in anthropomorphic terms, complete with human vices (p. 75). As with a priori
reasoning, the main mischief Hopkins attributes to allegorical interpretation is support for the idea that God is incorporeal—references
to his face, hands, feet, and the like were interpreted as metaphorical
allusions to other attributes, such as his approval, power, or changelessness (see, e.g., p. 76). Similar methods of interpretation were used
to finesse other scriptural references to God, including texts that attribute to him such humanlike emotions as anger or regret.
By contrast with Greek interpretation, which is always labeled
“allegorical,” Hopkins refers to Hebrew methods of interpretation
as either “literal” or “figurative,” acknowledging that there is “figurative language used by the prophets in their statements about God”
(p. 73). Hopkins does not explain what carefully drawn distinction
allows him to approve of figurative interpretation while consistently
disapproving of allegorical interpretation. As he employs the notion,
though, the operative distinction is captured in statements like the
following: “Some Greek exegetes became almost indifferent to the
original meaning of the writer, interpreting all passages allegorically
to suit their pet theories” (p. 76), or “e result was to impress on
scripture the views of the interpreter, rather than the reverse process
intended by God” (p. 77). is is a roundabout way to criticize the
practice of simply wresting the scriptures to suit one’s preconceptions. Using the term allegorical in this peculiar way, Hopkins leaves
untouched the real and difficult question of how to know what
scriptural language is to be read literally and what figuratively (or al-
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legorically in its usual sense). “Allegorical interpretation” in the sense
Hopkins uses it threatens to become any nonliteral interpretation
that conflicts with one’s own view. Presumably, the real task is to assess the preconceptions that drive any given interpretation.
us part 1 has some real virtues—first, simply in familiarizing
the reader with some basic ideas from Greek philosophy, and second, in cultivating openness to and appreciation of the fragments
of truth to be found there. However, as an explanation of the Greek
roots of error in traditional theology, it is unsatisfying. His account
of substance would be helpful had Hopkins drawn upon it in his later
discussion of the Trinity. His accounts of metaphysics, of the notion
of a priori knowledge, and of the Hellenistic tradition of allegorical
interpretation are confused and obstruct serious engagement with
the Greek roots of Christian beliefs Hopkins means to criticize. ese
Christian traditional beliefs have their roots in particular metaphysical views, particular preconceptions that drive false interpretations, or
particular claims that are taken to be a priori truths. Rather than explaining what is wrong with the various Greek ideas, Hopkins’s words
metaphysics, a priori, and allegorical interpretation become little more
than labels he uses to prematurely dismiss ideas he disagrees with.

Part 2
Part 2 is the most successful portion of this book. It introduces
many of the key figures in the Christian community just aer the
deaths of the apostles, portrays their predicament, highlights truths
they still possessed, and offers an explanation of why and how these
truths were replaced by errors. As he had earlier done with the Greek
philosophers, Hopkins now celebrates the efforts and achievements
of the early Christians even though they also failed in many ways:
“Perhaps the greatest testimony this book bears to Latter-day Saints
is that they should not be critical or disparaging of these outstanding
and well-meaning early leaders as they become acquainted with them
in the pages that follow” (p. 30). Aer the intense persecutions that
took the lives of the apostles, the early Christians were le without
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proper leadership, were confused over which teachers and writings
were trustworthy, and had no authority to resolve the many differences and disputes that arose.
Hopkins emphasizes the role of a group known as the Apologists,
who were active in explaining and defending Christian faith during the second century. ough violent persecution had abated, the
Apologists were pressed by critics of the church, many of whom were
trained in Greek philosophy. In the process of answering these questions and challenges, and without proper guidance, the Apologists
misconstrued some doctrines and fabricated others. In particular,
as they tried to answer questions and challenges that were formulated from the perspective of philosophy, they were led to express
Christian beliefs in the language of philosophy. Not knowing better,
they oen portrayed Christian beliefs as being more similar to the
doctrines of the philosophers than they should have. us, rather
than calling philosophy the cause of error, it may be appropriate to
say that ignorance was the cause of erroneous beliefs and that philosophy simply filled the gap le when revelation ceased. I would love
to see more Latter-day Saints exposed to this sort of account of how
the early church fell into error. Too many LDS Sunday School lessons
evoke only images of scheming priests tailoring doctrines and editing
scriptures to suit their selfish purposes. e view Hopkins supports
better helps us approach both past and present traditional Christians
in love and fairness, as our brothers and sisters.
In part 2, as in part 1, Hopkins may be a bit too quick to draw
parallels between the beliefs of early Christians and Latter-day Saint
beliefs. Still, the Saints should be more aware of these interesting writings and should value the efforts of their authors. Becoming familiar
with their names and reading some of their texts makes these authors
human and helps to counterbalance the Latter-day Saint tendency to
simply define that period of history with a single word—apostasy.
With such a short history of our own and with our eyes always turned
to our living prophets, Latter-day Saints may think of the true church
as existing timelessly, in a perpetual present.
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But while the gospel is timeless, our understanding of it is not,
and we have much to gain from a careful study of Christian history.
First, we can learn from powerful Christian writers in history, as we
do from such insightful contemporaries as C. S. Lewis. Second, it
would be instructive to examine the development of the Christian
community as it spread and faced a variety of challenges over the
centuries. We Latter-day Saints will face some of the same challenges
as we more fully become a world church. ird, we should consider
to what extent we are shaped by the Christian community in which
the early members of the restored church were all raised and from
which most of our numerous converts still come. en, as now, converts bring old beliefs and habits with them, and we as a people may
not have fully disentangled ourselves from false traditions. We have
been chastised many times in our history for paying insufficient attention to the Book of Mormon. As traditional Christians read Greek
presuppositions into the Bible, so some of us may be reading traditional Christian presuppositions into the Bible, the Book of Mormon,
and our other modern revelations. For example, Latter-day Saint discussions of Christ’s atonement oen reflect a view of the atonement
that appears to derive from the work of Anselm centuries ago and is
difficult to reconcile with Alma’s teachings in the Book of Mormon.8
While we are rightly mindful of the danger that studying erroneous traditions may lead one into error, we should also acknowledge
that being ignorant of those traditions may keep us from recognizing
how they have already shaped our beliefs. Recent attention among
Latter-day Saints to the role of grace in our salvation oen reflects
a notion of grace as it is currently understood in Protestant circles,
but I believe that the scriptural notion of grace is closer to a Catholic
understanding of grace as found in the writings of omas Aquinas.
In my view, modern revelation shows that neither the Protestant
nor the Catholic view of grace is adequate, but without considering
8. While I do not agree with all his conclusions, Dennis Potter has an interesting
treatment of this issue in “Did Christ Pay for Our Sins?” Dialogue 32/4 (1999): 73–86.
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Aquinas’s view I might never have realized that I needed to rethink
the Protestant view I had inherited from my surrounding culture.
I applaud Hopkins’s detailed attention to important early Christians like the Apologists. I also find his account of the basic causes
of their theological error persuasive, though his discussion of the
particular origins of this or that mistaken belief may be unsatisfying. Hopkins considers the historical evidence in only enough detail
to illustrate how he envisions these causes operating; to argue convincingly that his view is historically correct would require a more
thorough study.9 However, anyone who doubts Hopkins’s basic account of how false doctrines entered the church through the work
of the second-century Apologists may find it interesting to consider
some features of Hopkins’s own work as a modern apologist. Perhaps
the most intriguing aspect of his book is that it displays some of the
same tendencies he attributes to the work of the early Apologists during the first few centuries aer the time of Christ. us the latter portion of the book might serve as a case study in support of the theory
of error advanced in the earlier portion of the book. Examples of the
following elements of the process of error appear in parts 3 and 4:
• Hopkins appeals to the philosophy of the day to support his
view of God, as did some early Christians. Early Christians built respect for their views by showing them to be in harmony with prevailing Hellenistic philosophical views. For example, they identified
Christ with the Logos, or Word, so important in Stoic and other Greek
thought, and they took an incorporealist view of God that fit with
the Greek view of matter as corrupt. Hopkins, for his part, appeals to
modern science and mathematics to deflect traditional Christian objections to Latter-day Saint cosmology. He also appeals to the modern view of the relationship of matter to energy to argue that God is
better understood as corporeal than incorporeal.
• Beyond simply supporting the scriptures and the teachings of
modern prophets by an appeal to science, Hopkins interprets them in
9. Presumably part of the job is done by Edwin Hatch in e Influence of Greek Ideas
on Christianity (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), which Hopkins cites frequently.
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terms of ideas drawn from contemporary science (the philosophy of our
day). Again, this is similar to how he portrays early Christians, who
interpreted their beliefs in terms of the philosophy of their day.
• Hopkins represents the Latter-day Saint position on certain
points in a way that is convenient for the discussion he has entered
but is not authoritative, just as the early Christian Apologists took
it upon themselves to answer questions that were pressed on them,
even though no clear answers were to be found in the authoritative
sources they possessed. In order to present a focused opposition to
the traditional Christian views he cites, Hopkins takes controversial
positions regarding the human conscience, God’s omniscience, the
relation of human freedom to divine providence, God’s relationship
to space and time, and the Edenic creation. All these views involve
his own speculation, beyond what can be supported with authoritative Latter-day Saint sources. He also frequently represents the scriptures as upholding his view much more obviously than they do, such
as in his discussion of God’s transcendence. In the case of conscience,
or the light of Christ, which I discuss above in relation to a priori
knowledge, Hopkins misrepresents both ancient and modern scripture to support his idiosyncratic view.
It is essential to realize that each of these basic tendencies (as
identified above in italics) is a legitimate way to approach the work
of apologetics, or the work of building understanding with those of
differing beliefs. I will argue this point at greater length below. ese
tendencies do not necessarily lead to error, but they may; and all of
them arguably did, both in the early church and, on a smaller scale,
in Hopkins’s book. Of course, some mistakes are sure to appear
in any human undertaking, and what allowed the second-century
Apologists’ errors to mislead the entire church was the absence of
continuing revelation and proper priesthood leadership.
ese examples boost the plausibility of Hopkins’s view of how
the early church fell into error long ago. If they occur in his own
work, similar developments could understandably have occurred in
the work of the early Apologists. Perhaps more important, these examples show that the same causes could easily lead to problems today
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if Latter-day Saint thinkers are not careful. As the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints becomes less a Rocky Mountain fortress
and more a global church, we become engaged in projects similar to
those of the ancient Apologists: we increasingly seek acceptance and
mutual understanding from those of other faiths and from the secular world. Hence we should be wary of repeating the mistakes the
Apologists made, as Hopkins does at times. I will elaborate on these
examples in the latter part of my discussion of parts 3 and 4.

Parts 3 and 4
In part 3, Hopkins turns to a number of traditional Christian
beliefs about God as they stand today. In the earlier sections he has
sketched explanations for error: loss of revelation, pressures to assimilate Greek ways of thinking, various influential strands of Greek
thought, and so forth. e task of part 3 is to show more particularly
what beliefs arose from these influences and that such beliefs are, in
fact, mistaken.
Problems of Polemicism
Unfortunately, this section is chronically unpersuasive and, what
is worse, frequently discourteous to those whose views it attacks. In
many cases Hopkins seriously understates the plausibility of views he
disagrees with. Sometimes he is simply inaccurate in explaining the
belief he opposes. More oen he fails to acknowledge what makes
the belief reasonable. Hopkins also habitually overstates his own case.
Not only does each of these problems prevent him from being persuasive, but their sheer frequency suggests a serious lack of respect
for his opponents. Moreover, in several places Hopkins more directly
implies that his traditional Christian opponents are insincere or intellectually irresponsible. Perhaps my comments will serve in part as
a sort of apology to those Hopkins has offended.
Inaccuracy. e discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity—particularly the belief that the members of the Godhead are consubstantial—is perhaps the most prominent example of inaccuracy in explain-
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ing a belief. is inaccuracy is particularly irksome because at certain
points Hopkins goes to some effort to acknowledge that the doctrine is
subtle (see pp. 19–91, 216),10 but when he actually tries to explain it, he
ignores that subtlety. Moreover, this is a crucial doctrine, and Hopkins
revisits it repeatedly without improvement. While he refers to the
words in which it is traditionally stated, he does not acknowledge, let
alone explain, their intended sense. For example, he alleges:
e elements of this doctrine are directly contradictory in a
real space-time universe, but each was considered essential.
ey are (1) the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are three
entirely separate persons; and (2) the Father, the Son and the
Holy Spirit are one singular substance (ousia). (pp. 141–42)
Here, Hopkins’s verbal statement of the two elements is acceptable,
though some might prefer to say that the members of the Godhead are
of one substance. Yet everything rides on capturing the proper sense of
substance, which Hopkins fails to do. e way in which he prefaces the
statement suggests that the sense of substance in this context is individual thing, so that three persons are described as one individual thing.11
Hopkins thus casts Trinitarians as self-consciously making a pair of
claims that cannot both hold in one world: one or both must be understood as holding true only in an alternate, metaphysical world—the “unreal reality” (p. 141) on which Hopkins erroneously centers his account
of metaphysics.12 Yet, as it is intended in the statement of the doctrine of
the Trinity—and as observed in the above discussion of Parmenidean
and post-Parmenidean metaphysics—substance does not mean exclusively an individual thing. us Hopkins badly misrepresents the
10. Indeed, Hopkins makes use of an interesting sense of substance in giving his account of the LDS view of the relationship of the Father and Son (see pp. 198, 231–32), but
he allows no such flexibility to Trinitarians.
11. It seems reasonable to claim this would be a contradiction, but one might still
have doubts. A chess set, for example, would seem to be both one thing and many things.
How about a basketball team?
12. Likewise on page 231: “Metaphysics allowed the Apologists the illusion of rational
thought in the formulation of this doctrine.”
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doctrine. Many traditional Christians misunderstand their own doctrine in much the way Hopkins does, but it remains a misunderstanding and should not be perpetuated.
In fact, the term substance is subtle and can be used in a variety
of senses. Further, the study of these senses belongs to metaphysics.
Yet there is much more to metaphysics than Hopkins acknowledges,
including much that belongs to common sense. Consider this dialogue for illustration:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:

What is in this box?
A copper wire, a copper bracelet, and a copper coin.
How many things are in the box?
ree.
How many substances are in the box?
One; the things are all copper.

ere is nothing puzzling about this use of substance; it would
be at home in a high school science classroom. Yet in this case, there
is clearly no contradiction when we state, parallel to Hopkins’s statement of the doctrine of Trinity:
1. e wire, the bracelet, and the coin are three separate objects
or things, and
2. e wire, the bracelet, and the coin are one substance.
us Hopkins is too quick in claiming a contradiction between
elements (1) and (2) of the doctrine of the Trinity: being three things
can be compatible with being one substance. Of course, God is not a
mineral. Trinitarians have a different sense of substance in mind; my
point is that there are several to choose from.13
Because Hopkins disregards the variety of meanings that adhere
to the term substance, he fails to properly identify the traditional
doctrine of consubstantiality, let alone to criticize it effectively. Ad13. In fact, there appears to be a variety of ways Trinitarians understand the doctrine
of consubstantiality: even the bishops who participated in the Council of Nicea were
divided over the choice of the word homoousios and were not in consensus as to what it
meant. Robert Jenson, e Triune Identity (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982), 86.
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mittedly, traditional Christians oen have trouble explaining it, and
they do not all agree, but this is no justification for Hopkins’s casual
dismissal. A critic, more than anyone, has a responsibility to identify
properly that which he means to criticize.14
Acknowledging too little. A more pervasive problem is the misrepresentation of scriptural grounds for the various traditional Christian
beliefs. Hopkins habitually examines fewer scriptural passages than
could be cited to support the traditional views; sometimes he claims
a complete lack of scriptural support. For example, returning to the
doctrine of consubstantiality, Hopkins alleges, “e only verse in
the Bible that sounds remotely Trinitarian, 1 John 5:7, has been rejected by scholars as a later addition to the text” (p. 244). is claim
is embarrassingly inaccurate since anyone conversant with the Bible
can identify many verses that at least sound Trinitarian: “he that hath
seen me hath seen the Father” (John 14:9), “I and my Father are one”
(John 10:30), and “In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was
with God, and the Word was God” (John 1:1) are only three of them.
Moreover, Hopkins’s eagerness to discount 1 John 5:7 is ill-suited to a
Latter-day Saint since several Book of Mormon passages sound even
more Trinitarian (I will return to this point below). Something like
consubstantiality seems to be at work in many biblical passages about
persons other than God, as when Christ says of husband and wife,
“they are no more twain, but one flesh” (Matthew 19:6), or when the
14. At this point, having defended the traditional Christian view against Hopkins,
perhaps I should say a few words to clarify my own position. My own objection to the
Nicene statements about the Godhead is less with the particular statements themselves
than with their status as a creed and with their obscurity. e Book of Mormon explicitly
teaches that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are one God. I suspect there is a meaningful sense of substance according to which they are one substance, or at least are of one
substance. For starters, they are one heavenly government, and they are of one mind
and one will. I believe the main inadequacy of the traditional Christian understanding
of the Godhead is that it does not reflect how fully God’s other children can join in the
Godhead’s unity. e LDS perspective on the Godhead is preferable most of all because it
reflects just how much like God, and how unified with him, his children can become. As
Christ reflects in his intercessory prayer, “at they all may be one; as thou, Father, art in
me, and I in thee, that they also may be one in us” (John 17:21).
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creation story says, “Male and female created he them; and blessed
them, and called their name Adam” (Genesis 5:2).
Similarly, Hopkins says of a priori knowledge: “there is no scriptural authority for that notion” (p. 208). Yet several New Testament
scriptures, as well as a much more extended passage in Doctrine and
Covenants 93, seem to refer to something of the kind, as I explain
when discussing part 1. Again, as Hopkins considers in what sense
Christ was begotten or created by the Father, he states, “Nothing in
the Bible even suggests that Christ was ‘generated’” (p. 239). Yet three
sentences later he refers to the biblical Greek term monogenes, meaning “only child.” e English term generation and its relatives are all
lexical descendants of the same Greek root and refer precisely to the
distinctive process whereby children are produced. Hopkins, who
emphasizes that Christ was begotten by God, should have no complaint about the term generated.
While Hopkins seriously understates the scriptural support for
various traditional Christian beliefs, he also is oen too quick to read
scriptural passages as supporting his own view, as I illustrate below
when considering Hopkins’s interpretation of scripture in terms of
science and other dubious presentations of Latter-day Saint doctrine.
In all these examples, Hopkins seems more eager to contradict his
opponents than to convey the truth about the scriptures. In considering the traditional Christian idea that God is a radically different sort
of being from humans, and before laying out his criticisms, Hopkins
says flatly, “ere is no biblical basis for this doctrine” (p. 394). Again,
Hopkins’s claim is completely untenable. Many passages in the Bible
emphasize the great differences between God and his mortal children. Two passages from the Old Testament come to mind right away.
“For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher
than your ways, and my thoughts than your thoughts” (Isaiah 55:9).
e difference in height between the heavens and the earth suggests
far more than a mere matter of degree: what could be more different in height from the earth than the heavens? More directly: “And
also the Strength of Israel [God] will not lie nor repent: for he is not
a man, that he should repent” (1 Samuel 15:29). If this sentence does
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not appear to suggest that God is a different kind of being from a
man, what would? Other examples could be brought forward in support of the traditional view. Of course, I believe that a careful reading
of the Bible as a whole soens the meaning of these passages and
ultimately supports the Latter-day Saint view. In particular, the description of us as God’s children should be understood to mean that
we are rudimentary instances of the same type of being. Still, to insist
that the Bible provides no basis for the traditional belief is to ignore
the obvious.
Insensitivity. Further, this claim is likely to alienate any self-respecting traditional Christian and to disturb a sensitive Latter-day Saint
reader. For not only is the claim false, but it also implies a charge of
bad faith. A reasonable Christian should pay attention to whether core
beliefs such as this one have a basis in the Bible. e claim that there is
no biblical support for differences between God and man thus implies
that those who believe this doctrine are irresponsible in the adoption
of their beliefs. It is bad form for a scholar to say an insensitive thing
like this at all, let alone when it is factually untenable.
Early in this review I referred to Hopkins’s comparison of traditional Christians to the Pharisees of Christ’s time. To lightly call
someone a hypocrite is bad, and to call one an idolater is presumably
worse; but Hopkins does not flinch: “e idea that God is incorporeal
is the very essence of idolatry” (p. 274). Certainly, some traditional
Christians have compared the Latter-day Saint belief that God is corporeal to idolatry, but one unreasonable and offensive allegation does
not excuse another. In his eagerness to press this upsetting claim,
Hopkins becomes incoherent. On one page he asserts, “e gods of
idol worshippers see, and hear and smell in exactly the same way
the God of classical theism does—without benefit of sensory organs”
(p. 274), only to refer on the next to idols as “‘the work of man’s
hands, wood and stone, which neither see nor hear nor eat nor smell’”
(p. 275, quoting Deuteronomy 4:28). He seems prepared to represent
idols as seeing or not seeing, hearing or not hearing, as it may suit his
argument from one point to the next. It is unfortunate that such uncharitable ranting should obscure a truly interesting argument from
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scripture that God is indeed corporeal, that he not only sees, hears,
and smells but even eats. Indeed, the classic Old Testament criticism
of idols appears to presuppose that the true God does these things, as
idols do not.
Seeds of Error
I have illustrated how Hopkins repeatedly misrepresents traditional Christian belief and its basis in scripture and how his remarks
are oen insensitive or worse. I now turn to a set of more ambiguous
points about parts 3 and 4, in which Hopkins’s work exemplifies key
elements of the very process of error he describes in part 2 as leading
to apostasy in the early church. I consider most of the examples I cite
to be failures insofar as they were meant to defend Latter-day Saint
belief. However, they provide interesting support for Hopkins’s view
of how the mistaken beliefs took hold.
Initially, I highlight instances in which Hopkins offers as support for his claims—including Latter-day Saint beliefs—the argument that they harmonize with contemporary scientific views. As
Hopkins portrays them, the Apologists tried to improve Christianity’s
reception in the dominant Hellenistic culture by emphasizing its
harmony with the prevailing Hellenistic philosophical views where
possible. is was a reasonable thing to do then and is so now. Truth
will harmonize with truth, and we should recognize truth wherever
it is found. Indeed, the great missionaries Paul (e.g., Acts 17:23) and
Aaron (Alma 22:9–11) both used a similar technique, appealing to
ideas familiar to their audiences to introduce their message. Without
the guidance of the Holy Spirit, however, it does have dangers. One is
that the credibility of revealed truth can be damaged in the long run
by seeming to rely on foreign philosophical or scientific claims that
may prove to be false. A graver peril is that, in the process of parsing
one’s beliefs about God in terms that can be related to scientific theories, one may distort those beliefs. Hopkins claims that the Apologists
distorted the truth as they parsed their beliefs about God in terms
of Greek philosophy. Similarly, I will examine instances in which
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Hopkins interprets Latter-day Saint theology or scriptures in terms of
ideas taken from modern science and technology, arguably distorting
those scriptures in the process.
In other cases Hopkins represents the Latter-day Saint position
on certain points in a way that is convenient for the discussion he has
entered but is not authoritative. In these cases, it is not science but
some other feature of Hopkins’s agenda that leads to the distortion.
Again, it is reasonable—even inevitable—that in discussing the nature of God one will face questions to which one has not received an
authoritative answer. It is oen appropriate to answer these questions
if one acknowledges that the answer is one’s personal view. Indeed,
even the authors of scripture do this on occasion. e problems
arise when unauthoritative views conflict with, are mistaken for, or
supplant authoritative teachings. roughout this section I will also
comment on whether Hopkins’s arguments against his opponents are
cogent.
Appeals to Science. Appealing to modern science in criticizing the
metaphysical notions behind the traditional Christian conception of
God, Hopkins asserts, “Modern science provides no support whatever
for the metaphysical notion of a timeless eternity outside the real
universe” (pp. 211–12). is is an empty assessment that passes too
quickly even to verify that it makes a relevant claim. For one thing,
the Parmenidean metaphysics he has described is not the metaphysics behind the traditional Christian view of God; for another, it is not
certain what sort of support we should expect from modern science
for any metaphysical view, since science generally investigates particular empirical phenomena. Still, this statement illustrates Hopkins’s
reliance, legitimate or not, on the authority of modern science.
Hopkins makes a similarly vague appeal to scientific authority to
more specifically support his claim that three persons cannot be one
individual thing: “Both scientists and philosophers recognize that the
idea of a personal being, as opposed to a legal entity, involves a distinct
center of consciousness that has a specific location in time and space.
is understanding of personality simply does not fit into the makeup
of a being like that imagined in the Trinity of classical theism” (p. 225).
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Presumably, some scientists and philosophers would subscribe to
this view of personhood, but Hopkins does not say who, and there is
certainly no consensus to this effect among philosophers. Moreover,
it is doubtful that this question lies within the scope of authority of
any coalition of scientists or philosophers; for while it may be clear
what it means for a human body or a brain to have a location in time
and space, it is far from clear what it would mean for a “center of consciousness” to have such a location. Where is a person’s center of consciousness when that person is contemplating the events of creation
or is asleep? e empirically minded might insist that it is always in
the brain or body, but this assumes that a person must be corporeal,
which is precisely one of the questions in dispute in a discussion of
the Godhead.
Hopkins makes a more involved call upon modern mathematics to
support certain points of Latter-day Saint cosmology that have come
under criticism: “Modern mathematics has shown that the finite and
the infinite are not so far removed from each other as the ancient Greeks
supposed” (p. 401). Hopkins responds specifically to Beckwith’s formulation of these criticisms, which is in some ways reminiscent of
ancient Greek reflections on the infinite. While he correctly states
that Beckwith’s criticisms of Latter-day Saint views do not stand up
in the light of modern mathematics, his own defense fares little better, for he gets key points of the mathematics wrong. Indeed, many
of Hopkins’s and Beckwith’s arguments have been obsolete since the
Middle Ages, when al-Ghazali, Maimonides, and omas Aquinas
thoroughly studied questions like this about space and time. is is
hardly the place for a complete exposition of the mathematics of infinity or the topology of beginnings and ends, but I will give examples
of key confusions in Hopkins’s discussion: Beckwith argues that the
Latter-day Saint understanding of eternal progression implies the
present existence of infinitely many gods and intelligences, and he
objects to this implication. Hopkins responds by claiming that “In the
real universe . . . there could be an infinite number of ‘kingdoms,’ and
each of those kingdoms could be infinite in dimension.” He argues
for this as follows:
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Not only can infinite space be divided into an infinite
number of infinitesimal points, it can include an infinite
number of finite spatial segments (e.g., sixteen-cubic-inch
cubes). Each of these segments has at least one finite measurement (length, area or volume), but in infinite space it
does not matter how big or how small those finite measurements are. ey could even be infinitely large or infinitely
small. (pp. 402–3)
Here Hopkins simply ignores the distinction between the finite and
the infinite. ere is no such thing as an infinitely large finite measurement: infinite means “not finite.”15 Hopkins goes on to draw several convenient consequences from this nonsensical claim.
Beckwith also objects to the Latter-day Saint belief that the universe has no beginning. Hopkins counters that it is “fundamentally
irrational” to believe that the universe does have a beginning (and
hence that there is a beginning of time). He argues:
If, in the classical view of heaven, there was no time before
the creation of the sensory universe, either events would have
to occur without any chronological order, or God would have
to be doing absolutely nothing. e latter notion is inconsistent with the character and attributes of the God described in
the Bible, and the former idea is impossible. (p. 415)
Perhaps Hopkins is right to exclude the option of events occurring without chronological order, but the alternative is reasonable—
not exactly that God would be doing nothing, but that there would
be no change. Time is the measure of change: We can only judge the
passing of time by observing changes, such as the motion of the sun
or of the hands of a clock, or the turning of the leaves in autumn.
us, if God’s activity were unchanging, there might be no time. In
fact, traditional Christians typically claim that God is and has always
15. It would be appropriate to say, “ese finite measurements could be indefinitely
large,” meaning that for any finite size one picks, they could be bigger; but indefinitely
large is not infinitely large.

 • T FARMS R / ()

been unchanging in essential respects and that time only makes
sense in relation to created things, which do change. ey draw upon
scriptures like Malachi 3:6, which says, “For I am the Lord, I change
not,” or James 1:17, which refers to “the Father of lights, with whom is
no variableness.” Similar statements appear in the Book of Mormon,
such as in Mormon 9:9. us Hopkins once again dismisses the opposing view prematurely.16 Of course, Beckwith’s arguments that
there must be a beginning to time are also unconvincing, but not for
the reasons Hopkins gives.
Hopkins cites various facts of neurology in a speculation on the
suitability of the human brain for holding Godlike knowledge (see
p. 321). He refers to developments in “Gestalt psychology” to support
his view of how resurrected humans might progress toward omniscience (see p. 435). He pauses for an especially elusive comment on
the colorful topic of the quantum structure of vacuum (see pp. 286–
87). He refers to modern telecommunications to support his view
that God is omnipresent despite having a specific spatial location (see
pp. 316, 340–42). In all these cases, Hopkins tends to mischaracterize
the claims of science or mathematics to support his understanding of
revealed truths, rather than the other way around. us his appeals
to the received wisdom of his day seem less likely to lead to a corruption of revealed truth than those of the early Christian Apologists
did. Still, he presents some odd renderings of Latter-day Saint beliefs
along the way, such as when he alludes to infinite intervals between
events in spiritual progression or marks the distinction between
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in terms of centers of consciousness—a
notion whose connection with scripture is dubious. ese are the
sorts of renderings that could lead to distortions of revealed truth if
they were more plausible.
Parsing of Scripture and Doctrine in Terms of Science. In other
cases Hopkins seems so bent on interpreting revelation in terms of
16. Again, my own view on these questions differs from the view of traditional
Christians, but I do not attribute their view to irrationality or intellectual carelessness; I
attribute it to their lacking the benefits of modern revelation.
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modern science that he disregards the integrity both of revelation
and of science. For example, as a prelude to addressing Beckwith’s
criticisms of Latter-day Saint cosmology, Hopkins rehearses a number of surprising points in the mathematical theory of infinite sets.
During this rehearsal he distinguishes two orders of infinity: the
order of the natural, or of the rational numbers; and the order of the
real numbers, or of the points in a continuous space, plane, or line.
Hopkins alleges that God has the distinction between these two orders of infinity in mind in several scriptural passages:
Indeed, it is the meaning of God’s reference to the sands of the
sea as “innumerable” (e.g., Gen. 22:17; Jer. 33:22; Heb. 11:12).
e “sands of the sea” is simply an analogy that refers to “the
number of points in the universe [or in a continuous space].”
(p. 403; cf. 427)
Hopkins offers no support for this claim. ough connecting the
word of God with the most obscure pronouncements of science may
impress some readers, this claim is quite baseless. First, there is no
indication that the Hebrews had language to distinguish orders of
infinity; second, it is hard to imagine why God would care to distinguish between orders of infinity in his communication with the
Hebrews; third, mathematically speaking, the sands of the sea are not
analogous to the points of the universe in this respect. Since grains
of sand are finite in size (even if there are infinitely many grains of
sand), the grains are countably infinite, like the natural or rational
numbers, rather than uncountably infinite, like the points of space.
ough there is no substance to these appeals to mathematics
and science, one can see why Hopkins would be powerfully drawn
to make them and how they would have a significant effect on readers who are unaware of their error. It would be surprising if the early
Christian Apologists did not succumb to similar temptations and
sometimes distort both philosophy and revelation as a result.
A use of science that leads to a more disturbing rendering of
Latter-day Saint belief is Hopkins’s attempt to support the belief that
God is corporeal by drawing upon Einstein’s celebrated equation for
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mass-energy equivalence, E=mc2. Admittedly, the high esteem in which
Latter-day Saints hold matter, as expressed in Doctrine and Covenants
93:33, fits more easily with modern scientific views than Platonic views
do. Yet though this appeal to E=mc2 may be impressive or entertaining
to some readers, as a piece of reasoning it is a total failure.17
Hopkins’s basic line of reasoning is as follows (see pp. 308–9):
1. A particle of matter at rest represents an amount of energy (E) equal to the particle’s mass (m) times the speed of light (c)
squared (E=mc2).
2. e speed of light is 3×1010 cm/s.
3. e speed of light squared is 9×1020 cm2/s2.
4. us a unit of mass represents 9×1020 units of energy.
5. us a being made of matter would be 9×1020 times as powerful as a being made of energy.
6. us a corporeal state, as in Latter-day Saint belief, is more worthy of God than an incorporeal state, as in traditional Christian belief.
ere are multiple serious problems with this reasoning. First,
to represent God’s power by a finite, calculable quantity of energy is
wholly inadequate. e fact that energy and power are not the same
thing, scientifically speaking, may be the least of Hopkins’s difficulties. More important is the fact that the scientific notions of energy,
mass, and power all have little to do with the kind of power we ascribe to God, or to almost anything, in usual speech. Which corporeal
entity, for instance, is more powerful: a 20-ton heap of sand (the most
massive), a 3/4-ton sports car, a 500-pound bomb, a few ounces of
weapons-grade anthrax, or a sincere note written in a difficult hour
(the least massive)? For these items we hardly think of mass as the
index of power; for God it is surely even less relevant.
Any quantity of energy, scientifically speaking, or power, which is
the rate of output of energy, is of dubious relevance when considering
God’s power. God made the sun, which radiates energy equivalent to
17. Delivered in the right tone of voice, this argument might be a creative and effective
satire of some of the philosophical arguments that a corporeal state would be unworthy of
God. Unfortunately, in its context I doubt most readers will hear it in that way.
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millions of metric tons of mass each second. e energy represented
by the mass of a human body would not fuel the sun for an eye blink,
and yet Christ is the light of the sun and of the stars (see D&C 88:7–
9). us, clearly the particular mass of God’s body is no indication of
how powerful he is. Moreover, this immense outpouring of energy in
the sun and stars is not his most wonderful power. How much energy,
scientifically speaking, does it take to purify a human heart? Clearly
these scientific concepts are of little use in considering the power of
God, even though he is corporeal. To attempt to apply them suggests
a lack of appreciation of the wonder of God’s power.
Second, the traditional Christian God simply is not a being of energy as physicists use the term. e comparison may have value as a
metaphor, and certainly God is the source of light and other energy. Yet
from a Platonic perspective, for example, energy in the physicist’s sense
belongs clearly to the realm of matter: it moves through space and
changes form dramatically, as God does not. e traditional Christian
God is not “composed of pure energy” (p. 308). He is not “composed
of” any other thing; he is the source of everything. us Hopkins’s comparison of matter to energy tells us nothing about the nature of the traditional Christian God, and his argument against such an incorporeal
God thus has no force.
One might hope to find that the third problem is a misunderstanding of some subtlety of relativistic dynamics, but it is much
more basic. Hopkins’s reasoning involves a misunderstanding of the
role of units in an equation, a concept carefully treated in a forum
no less arcane than the average high school physics class. Essentially,
the mistake occurs in separating the numbers involved in the equation from the units in which the various quantities are expressed.
is is like trying to tell which of two rulers is the longer merely by
asking what number it ends with. Of course, a ruler that ends with
“30” (centimeters) may simply be the flip side of a ruler that ends in
“12” (inches). e fact that a distance of 100 yards is expressed with a
larger number does not mean that it refers to a distance longer than 2
miles. In gauging an actual quantity, knowing the unit is as crucial as
knowing the number.
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When Hopkins says, “it would require nearly 900 quintillion
(900,000,000,000,000,000,000) units of energy to be equivalent to
just one unit of mass” (p. 308), he neglects to acknowledge that this
number depends entirely on the choice of units. Many different units
are used to measure energy, as well as to measure mass or linear distance or speed. If he had chosen to express the speed of light in kilometers per second, he would have derived a ratio of only 90 billion
(90,000,000,000) to 1. If he had expressed it in astronomical units
(the average distance from the earth to the sun) per hour, he would
have derived a ratio of about 52 to 1. If he had expressed it in lightyears per second (c=3.17×10-8 ly/s), he would have found his result
reversed: it requires 1 quadrillion (1015), or 1,000,000,000,000,000
units of mass, to equal one unit of energy. How many units of mass
equal one unit of energy simply depends on the arbitrary choice of
units; it says nothing about the relative “power” of matter and energy.
at an argument involving such an elementary error should
appear in print at all is disturbing. It is also troubling that Hopkins
expresses the speed of light in units that seem chosen to boost the
number generated by his flawed reasoning. Among a great variety of
units one might use to express the speed of light, the most standard
are either meters per second or centimeters per second. Convenient
to Hopkins’s purpose, choosing centimeters per second instead
of meters per second as the unit for the speed of light—the c in
Einstein’s equation—adds four zeroes onto the end of the number the
calculation produces (1002). e choice of units thus increases “the
ratio of corporeality to incorporeality” (p. 309) by a factor of 10,000,
boosting one’s impression of how much more powerful a corporeal
God would supposedly be than an incorporeal God. One worries that
his might be a deliberate effort to inflate an argument that lacks rational substance of its own. With its distorted representations of God
and his power, and of the implications of science, this argument easily compares with the distortions of truth Hopkins attributes to the
early Christian Apologists.
Dubious or Problematic Presentation of Doctrine. If Hopkins’s
use of science in his reasoning is problematic, it must be said that his
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representations of the Latter-day Saint position on certain points are
just as precarious. In some instances, what he says is consistent with
authoritative Latter-day Saint teaching, but in others it is not.
On the subjects of God’s omniscience, his foreknowledge, and
the relationship of human freedom to divine providence, Hopkins
takes positions that are reasonable and theologically acceptable for
a Latter-day Saint to take, although they are somewhat controversial
(see pp. 313–15, 317–18). Some Latter-day Saints would take different
positions, all more or less equally compatible with modern revelation.
However, in the course of explaining how LDS belief differs from classical theism, Hopkins frequently takes just one of a few views open to
Latter-day Saints, presenting it as though it were the only viable view.
For example, in opposing the traditional view that God is outside
of time, Hopkins criticizes the view that God has direct knowledge
of future events. He maintains instead that God knows the future
because he can predict it based on his knowledge of past and present events and of his own plans. However, another Latter-day Saint
might hold that God, while acting in time, knows the future directly
in much the same way as he knows the present: “all things are present before mine eyes” (D&C 38:1). In a situation like this it would
be better to acknowledge the variety of views that Latter-day Saints
may reasonably take. Paradoxically, Hopkins cites a drive toward unification of belief as one of the factors that accelerated the apostasy
among the early Christians (see p. 147). When the points on which
unity was pursued could not be resolved through inspiration, people
became unified in error, rather than holding a variety of views among
which the truth was still to be found. It would be fitting, then, for
Hopkins to more readily acknowledge and respect variation in belief
among Latter-day Saints.
Hopkins is particularly emphatic about unity of belief among
Latter-day Saints in his rejection of Beckwith’s five-point summary
of Latter-day Saint theology. He claims that “with the exception of
one or two statements, the entire Mormon Church would stand in
disagreement with Dr. Beckwith’s summary of its teachings” (p. 23).
ough some would disagree, I also know thoughtful and faithful
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Latter-day Saints who agree with all five points of Beckwith’s summary.
ough Hopkins denies Beckwith’s contention that “both the later
writings of Joseph Smith and current Mormon orthodoxy clearly assert these five points” (as cited in Hopkins, p. 23), he does not address
the issue with argument. As it happens, in the course of his book
Hopkins himself eventually grants four of the five points and concedes most of the fih.
In other cases Hopkins presents a view that is very problematic
for a Latter-day Saint to take. Hopkins’s zeal leads him to misrepresent the scriptures’ teaching on two rather important points: the light
of Christ and the purpose of the Edenic creation. In my discussion of
part 1 above, I examined how Hopkins seriously distorts the scriptural
teachings about conscience, or the light of Christ, in Romans 2 and
in Doctrine and Covenants 93 when he attacks the Greek notion of a
priori knowledge. He seems to approach these passages with his mind
already made up as to what they should say, much like the ancient
practitioners of allegorical interpretation whom he criticizes elsewhere.
Further, in critiquing the traditional Christian sense of the gap
between God the creator and his creatures, Hopkins claims that the
creation was perfect as it was first created. He argues purely from
one phrase used in Genesis: “When He finished the earth and all that
He created in it, He pronounced it ‘very good.’ . . . For God, a perfect
being, that statement can only be taken as an indication that His creation was perfect.” He further claims, “What God made was perfect,
not inferior, and it was meant to last forever” (p. 238). It is rather bold
to equate “very good” with “perfect” on no other basis than this. is
inference is made even more dubious by the fact that the first humans
chose the path of disobedience. ey were part of God’s creation, but
evidently their wills, at least, were imperfect.
Moreover, Hopkins’s claim conflicts with the Latter-day Saint
understanding of the Edenic state and the fall. According to Abraham
3:24–26, a key part of God’s purpose in creating the earth and placing his children on it was to test their obedience, opening to them
the possibility of a stage of development much greater than just the
embodiment Adam and Eve received in Eden. Second Nephi 2:22–25
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further clarifies that the fall was necessary for this plan to go forward:
if not for the fall Adam and Eve would have had no children, “wherefore they would have remained in a state of innocence, having no
joy.” Yet joy is a crucial part of God’s plan for us: “Adam fell that men
might be; and men are, that they might have joy.” God did not intend
his creations to remain forever in the state in which he le them
when he pronounced them “very good” in Genesis 1. Rather, the
mortal state that all earthly life entered through the fall of Adam was
a necessary phase leading to one even more perfect than the idyllic
Eden. Mistakes on fundamental points like this, uncorrected, led the
early Christians into apostasy.
In his effort to distance himself from traditional Christian Trinitarians, Hopkins goes so far as to call into question the authenticity
of 1 John 5:7, which he sees as the most Trinitarian-sounding verse
in the Bible. It reads: “For there are three that bear record in heaven,
the Father, the Word, and the Holy Ghost: and these three are one.”
Apparently, Hopkins is uncomfortable with the statement that the
three members of the Godhead are one. Indeed, in my experience
many Latter-day Saints are uncomfortable with this way of speaking because it sounds reminiscent of traditional Trinitarianism. is
is problematic, however, because it leads us to be selective in reading
not just the Bible, but even the Book of Mormon. Consider 2 Nephi
31:21: “And now, behold, this is the doctrine of Christ, and the only
and true doctrine of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy
Ghost, which is one God, without end.” Alma 11:44 similarly refers
to these three as “one Eternal God,” and Mosiah 15:4–5 twice calls the
Father and Son “one God.” To top it off, when Christ says in 3 Nephi
11:36, “the Father, and I, and the Holy Ghost are one,” he is affirming
that the other members of the Godhead will bear record of him and
of the doctrine he is presenting; in other words, his point is exactly
parallel to the point of 1 John 5:7. Clearly, Hopkins’s attempt to discount 1 John 5:7 for sounding too Trinitarian is a mistake. is type
of mistake is very tempting for an apologist in any century, and we
must beware of it.
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It is interesting to note that whereas the general dri of error
among Christians aer the deaths of the apostles was to assimilate
their views to those of Hellenistic philosophy, Hopkins’s tendency is
to exaggerate differences between the Latter-day Saint view and the
traditional Christian view. us his tendency in expressing unauthoritative views is opposite to theirs. However, error in either direction
is destructive. Whether we draw nearer to or farther from our opponents through overzealous apologetics, if we neglect the message of
revelation, we fall into error.
My examples hardly exhaust the problems with Hopkins’s text. I
present them as points calling for correction in their own right but
also as illustrations of the generally polemical construction of parts 3
and 4. At times Hopkins’s drive to disagree with classical theists overpowers his attention to the integrity of his own Latter-day Saint tradition and belief. Even in cases in which Hopkins is merely unpersuasive, the sheer number of times he raises a thesis and dismisses it too
quickly suggests disrespect for our traditional Christian brothers and
sisters. And by heaping up masses of unconvincing arguments, I fear
that he actually makes the Latter-day Saint view look less plausible.

Reflections
e overall format of Hopkins’s presentation is well chosen, beginning with highlights of Greek philosophy, looking with some care
at the period following the deaths of the original apostles, and, with
that historical and conceptual background, proceeding to a closer examination of the various doctrinal disagreements between traditional
Christianity and the restored church. e history helps one understand the contemporary debate, besides being interesting in its own
right. e charitable tone of Hopkins’s history also represents a very
welcome corrective to the dismissive manner prevalent in popular
Latter-day Saint discussions of the few centuries following the deaths
of the original apostles. Unfortunately, in some of its details Hopkins’s
presentation is still disappointing.
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We Latter-day Saints need a book like this one aspires to be.
However, we need a book that proceeds much more cautiously and
shows a much greater attention to and respect for opposing views,
neither co-opting them prematurely (as in parts 1 and 2 of Hopkins’s
book) nor dismissing them prematurely (as in parts 3 and 4). It
should acknowledge how much of traditional Christian thought is
reasonable for someone without the benefits of modern revelation.
It should not only be accurate in characterizing individual opposing views, but it should address the great variety of views to be found
in traditional Christianity. It should acknowledge the major views
present not only in recent evangelical thought, such as Beckwith
represents, but in Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and other
Protestant thought, both now and historically. To vindicate the teachings of the restoration, it is not enough to discredit just one of the
many traditional views. Further, the agenda of this book should be
set in response to great thinkers—such as Augustine, Aquinas, Luther,
and Calvin, who represent the best traditional Christianity has to
offer—rather than to minor contemporaries.
e work I am describing would involve far more than one
volume can establish. Hopkins draws heavily on Edwin Hatch’s e
Influence of Greek Ideas on Christianity18 for his account of the origins of apostate views. Book X would also have to draw on several
books’ worth of work by Latter-day Saint scholars, much of which has
not yet appeared. To effectively compare Latter-day Saint belief with
traditional Christian belief will presuppose a finely honed assessment
of the boundaries of each body of beliefs. is involves establishing
both the authoritative core and the scope of acceptable variations
in belief.19 It is not enough simply to compare some beliefs Latter18. See note 9 above.
19. For example, both Alma (Alma 40:20) and Paul (1 Corinthians 7:25) express in
scriptural writings opinions which Latter-day Saints today would consider mistaken. Still,
they both were great prophets and teachers, pillars of the church in their time. Clearly,
then, there is a range of acceptable variation in belief among members and even leaders
of the Church of Jesus Christ. Today some Latter-day Saints believe God was always God,
but some don’t. To assess the scope of acceptable variation is a challenging task.
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day Saints hold with some beliefs traditional Christians hold; book
X must address how far the core of traditional Christian belief—or
the cores of the major Christian traditions—conflicts with the core
of LDS belief. Allegations of harmony or dissonance between Greek
philosophy or pre-Nicene Christianity and corresponding Latterday Saint thinking should take into consideration the context of the
Greek or pre-Nicene thinker’s work as a whole. In many cases like
this, book X should rely on a more focused book or article.
More important, appeals to the Bible to support a Latter-day Saint
view must acknowledge how far LDS readings of the Bible rely on assumptions drawn from modern revelation and how far assumptions
from other Christian traditions could be reconciled with the biblical
text in the absence of modern revelation. Book X should also comment on the viability of tradition itself, beyond the Bible, for shaping religious belief. Roman Catholics, for example, do not believe in
relying on sola scriptura; they appeal as well to the authority of a
continuous tradition of teaching traced to the original apostles, much
as Latter-day Saints appeal to a line of priesthood authority. Book X
might be largely self-contained in presenting its philosophical arguments, which tend to be compact in comparison to historical or textual arguments. Still, to be persuasive, its author would have to write
from a familiarity with the best philosophical arguments about God
and related questions as drawn from the entire history of philosophy,
not merely from the work of one contemporary polemicist.
Amid all this, book X would need to avoid either minimizing or
exaggerating the differences between Latter-day Saint and traditional
views, remaining anchored in a careful reading of the scriptures and
the teachings of modern prophets. Hopkins is not the only person
prone to define his views in the terms set by a controversy. In the debate between Latter-day Saints and evangelicals, we see the tendency
both to minimize differences and to exaggerate them. e latter tendency seems to show itself in the position taken by the evangelical
authors of e New Mormon Challenge. Among three points of evangelical belief that they take to be nonnegotiable, they include the two
points Latter-day Saints are most prone to criticize: belief that the
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members of the Godhead constitute one metaphysical substance and
belief in creation ex nihilo.20 On the other hand, LDS author Stephen
Robinson arguably goes too far in minimizing differences in How
Wide the Divide? 21
Of course, book X as I describe it would be a monumental work, and
I certainly don’t fault Richard Hopkins for not producing it. However,
having set itself roughly the same task, How Greek Philosophy Corrupted
the Christian Concept of God greatly suffers by not drawing on the depth
of preparation needed to accomplish the task well.
We Latter-day Saints need a book like Hopkins’s book aspires
to be, a single volume that addresses a general audience and shows
how strong the case is for LDS teachings about God, on the basis of
the Bible, history, and philosophy. Although these evidences are no
replacement for the witness of the Holy Spirit, they are still substantial and are worth studying, even aside from their persuasive force. I
hope that Hopkins’s work will spur other Latter-day Saints to revisit
the project more methodically and carefully.

20. Francis J. Beckwith, Carl Mosser, and Paul Owen, eds., e New Mormon Challenge: Responding to the Latest Defenses of a Fast-Growing Movement (Grand Rapids,
Mich.: Zondervan, 2002), 399–400. ey refer here to the doctrines of creation ex nihilo
and monotheism, but it is clear from the rest of the book that by monotheism they mean
the belief that God is one metaphysical substance.
21. David L. Paulsen and R. Dennis Potter argue as much in their contribution to the
Review issue on that book: “How Deep the Chasm? A Reply to Owen and Mosser’s Review,”
FARMS Review of Books 11/2 (1999): 221–64. Still, in many respects Blomberg and
Robinson’s book, How Wide the Divide? A Mormon and an Evangelical in Conversation
(Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity, 1997), is a fine example of respectful and well-informed
dialogue.

